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Abstract. The Internet of Things is progressively getting broader, evol-
ving its scope while creating new markets and adding more to the existing
ones. However, both generation and analysis of large amounts of data,
which are integral to this concept, may require the proper protection
and privacy-awareness of some sensitive information. In order to con-
trol the access to this data, allowing devices to verify the reliability of
their own interactions with other endpoints of the network is a crucial
step to ensure this required safeness. Through the implementation of a
blockchain-based Public Key Infrastructure connected to the Keybase
platform, it is possible to achieve a simple protocol that binds devices’
public keys to their owner accounts, which are respectively supported by
identity proofs. The records of this blockchain represent digital signa-
tures performed by this Keybase users on their respective devices’ public
keys, claiming their ownership. Resorting to this distributed and decen-
tralized PKI, any device is able to autonomously verify the entity in
control of a certain node of the network and prevent future interactions
with unverified parties.
Keywords: Internet of Things · Blockchain · Public Key Infrastructure.
1 Introduction
The Internet of Things concept gained popularity in the last couple of years.
The convergence of the Internet with the RFID capabilities constituted, from
the beginning, a powerful tool that provides great solutions for a wide variety of
problems. With an interconnected network of smart devices and sensors, a large
number of intelligent and autonomous services have been developed to improve
personal, professional and organizational activities. [15]
Together with the evolution of hardware components and the development of
new communication protocols and technologies, several innovative projects are
emerging. While smart houses are slowly becoming common, smart cities are
projected for a near future and the integration with health-care, agriculture and
wearables are gathering more attention.
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According to a Gartner’s report [14], the consumer segment has settled itself
as the largest supporter of the Internet of Things concept, with a total of 5.2
billion devices acquired in 2017, a number that is predicted to increase to the
7 billions by the end of 2018. Also the cross-industry seems to be progressively
investing in the technology with smart-buildings taking the lead for their low-
cost and highly interconnected devices.
As the number of users and devices grows, a larger amount of sensitive data is
generated, reflecting the state of each supervised environment, objects or human
beings’ conditions. Given the low memory capacity of the majority of these
devices, the data is required to flow through the network in order to be stored
in specific nodes. At the end, the gathered information can be transmitted to
application endpoints, where the data is analyzed and used for decision-making
tasks or statistical studies on various subjects.
Besides confidentiality and privacy, trust became an important factor for any
IoT system. The overall information shared through the network may, sometimes,
require each smart device to properly identify the origins of the received packages
as well as the recipients that it pretends to communicate with. Thus, defining
a consistent identity management system, capable of satisfying the authenticity
of each device towards the network, stands as a necessity to the evolution of
trustworthy systems.
In this paper, it is presented an IoT solution that focuses on a blockchain
implementation adapted to the Public Key Infrastructures roles on linking iden-
tities to public keys. In this case, it is pretended to link every device public key
to a specific person and ensure that every action performed by a certain node of
the network can be assigned to a proper entity.
The document begins by introducing the relevant concepts for this research,
on Section 2, followed by the description of the problem to be addressed and
which scenarios should be approached, in the third section. Further, in Sections
4 and 5, the implementation of the blockchain-based PKI is presented and the
results of the experiments recreated are discussed, respectively. Ending the pa-
per, the Section 7, concludes with some general observations over the research
presented and which improvements could be done in the future.
2 Background
2.1 Blockchain
A Distributed Ledger Technology (DLT) is a collection of data, shared and syn-
chronized across multiple individuals on a network, allowed to be geographically
spread through distinct locations. It does not rely on a central administrator
or centralized system for storage or management of data and it is supported on
peer-to-peer networks, with consensus algorithms that ensure the replication of
registries across the nodes. [9]
Blockchain came up as an implementation of a distributed ledger. The term
traces back to the Satoshi Nakamoto’s original whitepaper from 2008, where he
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applied it as the core component of the digital currency named Bitcoin. [16] A
blockchain is defined as a decentralized database, structured as a continuously
growing list of ordered blocks, identified by a cryptographic signature. These
blocks are linked in the chain by referring to the signature of the immediately
previous record in the list. The blockchain contains an immutable collection of
records of all the transactions processed, presenting a transparent, decentralized
and secure solution for many applications. [12]
Fig. 1. A representation of the relation between the blocks in a Blockchain.
The Figure 1 illustrates how valid records are stored in a blockchain. The
structure starts with a genesis block, an initial entry that marks the beginning of
the collection of information. Following it, every block in the blockchain should
contain the information respective to a specific transaction. Each of these trans-
actions must be digitally signed by the entity that is emitting it, constituting a
block. Upon a new block generation, the hash of the last block is retrieved and
this new entry ends up referencing that previous record, becoming immediately
linked to it. [17]
It can be assumed that a blockchain acts as a state transaction system, where
each state holds a snapshot of every transaction made until its creation. After the
introduction of a new transaction, a new block is generated and a new snapshot
is taken as a representation of this new state of the system. [10]
Every blockchain can be inserted into one of the three categories that Vi-
talik Buterin summarizes in [8]: public, consortium or fully-private. In the first
category, anyone in the world can read, send transactions to be approved on
the blockchain and even participate in the consensus process to determine which
blocks will be validated and added to the chain. The consensus on consortium
blockchains is controlled by a pre-selected set of participants, where a portion
of them have to sign a block in order to validate it. When it comes to read
permissions, these can be public, restricted to a certain target audience or even
hybrid, with routes that define different levels of permission. The fully private
blockchains are designed so that the write permissions are kept centralized to
a specific authority. However, read permissions can also be public or restricted,
like in the consortium blockchains.
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2.2 Public Key Infrastructure
Public key cryptography requires users to hold a key pair composed by a public
and a private keys. However, it is important to assure that a certain pair of keys
is linked to a specific entity. The Public Key Infrastructures can be interpreted
as systems that properly manage these same public keys and provide a record to
authenticate the link between them and their respective owners. Usually, these
records are based on digital certificates that verify the ownership of a public key
(and its corresponding pair, the private key) by some entity. Furthermore, it is
expected from a PKI that it supports a set of functionalities comprising regis-
tration and update of public keys, as well as revocation or backup of certificates.
[5]
Generally, there are two approaches to Public Key Infrastructures. The most
common one is the Certificate Authority-based (CA-based) PKI where the CA
is considered a trusted third party and must be considered that way by every
party involved in a transaction. The role of this Certificate Authority is to issue
certificates that authenticate the link between a public key and its rightful owner.
To trust in a Certificate Authority, every entity must accept a root certificate
for that CA in its own collection. From this root element, it branches through a
hierarchical certificate chain, where any certificate signed by a trusted certificate
is consequently trusted. [7]
Considering that most of the PKI’s basic are directly related to PGP’s con-
cepts, one other convectional approach is based on the Web of Trust definition.
Unlike the previously mentioned CA-based PKI, the trust becomes decentral-
ized. In this case, a certain signature on a given public key is trusted by a user
if it was already verified by a certain trusted party.
2.3 Pretty Good Privacy
Pretty Good Privacy is an encryption standard developed by Phil Zimmermann,
in 1991, that provides cryptographic privacy and authentication for communi-
cations. It can be used for signing, verification, encryption and decryption of
digital data such as emails, files, text or entire directories. [18]
PGP operations combine data compression with hashing and symmetrical
key with public key cryptography to provide integrity and confidentiality of
data. When information is exchanged between two actors, it is encrypted using
a symmetric encryption algorithm. The symmetric key, known as session key, is
used only once for encryption and decryption, and is refreshed as a new random
number in each cycle of communication. The data is sent to the receiver together
with session key, encrypted with the receiver’s public key. Every public key is,
therefore, linked to a single user and will be utilized by other entities anytime
they pretend to send him confidential information. Upon obtaining the data, a
receiver must first decrypt the session key with is own private key, which is kept
personal, and decrypt the message with the provided session key. An illustration
on the same procedure is shown in the Figure 2.
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Fig. 2. Encryption and Decryption procedures in the PGP standard. [6]
Authentication via digital signatures can be also achieved with PGP, thanks
to hashing and public-key cryptography. In a similar process to the one previ-
ously described, upon creating a message, the sender generates an hash code
(also known as a fingerprint of the data), and encrypts it using his own private
key. The hash is now attached to the message and sent to the receiver. This time,
the receiver must also create a fingerprint from the message and decrypt the re-
ceived hash with the sender’s public key. If the generated hash is compatible to
the received one, the authentication is successful.
Currently, PGP is mainly adopted for emailing systems, but has also been
implemented in digital signatures management, full encryption of memory par-
titions, directories and instant messaging session protection and, most recently,
for the encryption and signature of HTTP requests and responses through server
and client modules.
OpenPGP, which will be covered later on the document, is an open-source
standard for the world, under the RFC4880, and currently on the Internet Stan-
dards Track. It presents several specifications on encryption and decryption op-
erations that are followed by the majority of PGP applications.
Web of Trust is commonly introduced in systems that implement the Pretty
Good Privacy (PGP) standard, aiming to establish the authenticity of the link
between a specific public key and the respective owner, through a decentralized
trust model.
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When some message is encrypted with the public key of a targeted receiver, is
is important to know that the key belongs to the intended used. Assuming that
impersonation is a reality in any vulnerable network, simply loading a public
key from a public directory does not guarantee this association between a key
and a real identity.
The binding refers to the relation between a pair of public and private keys
and the identity of a specific person or organization. This relation is usually
defined through verifications upon interactions with other entities. Lets assume
that a user named Alice witnessed that Charlie is in the possession of a pair
of PGP keys and signed his public key with her own private key, in order to
vouch for him. If Charlie intend to email another user, called Bob, who doesn’t
know him, he might not trust Charlie right away. However, if Bob had previously
verified Alice and signed her key, thus trusting her, then he can indirectly assume
that Charlie is also trustworthy upon acknowledging that Alice signed his key.
With this model, the more people sign each others keys, the shorter the trust
paths between parties in a Web of Trust become. [11]
The PGP’s Web of Trust concept existed for over 20 years. However, techni-
cally, it is difficult to implement and utilize, requiring personal verifications and
becoming hard to know which trust level should be assigned on each verification.
In theory, the concept proves to be successful, except for the con that implies
that people are needed to validate a person’s possession of a GPG public key
before signing it.
3 Problem
With the number of identities in the IoT environment tending to grow, it be-
comes urgent for any platform to have the resources capable to manage them.
According to [13], in order to implement a consistent Identity Management Sys-
tem for the Internet of Things, some properties like privacy, security, mobility
and trustworthiness must be ensured.
In general, these ”things” present a direct relationship with real people,
concerning ownership or manufacturing, for instance. In IoT, these ownership
and identity relationships with real entities present a substantial impact on the
systems’ identity processes like authentication and authorization as it must be
required to determine, rigorously, who is the owner of a certain node on the
network.
The main issues that this paper pretends to target is the centralized data col-
lection of identities and management of devices, which is a method that doesn’t
scale in the context of IoT. In fact, managing billions of devices constantly ex-
changing messages between themselves in a smart and dynamic network, cannot
be efficiently implemented in a centralized system. [3]
Personal and private networks don’t require the verification of the ownership
from each node in the network. Usually, when a device is included in these types
of networks, they should go through a strict process of configuration and instal-
lation due to the system’s operations being closed to the external environment.
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The attention for this research focuses on specific kinds of networks, con-
sidered public, where multiple entities may participate while being globally dis-
tributed, if necessary. In this case, with a more opened environment and free
participation of unknown parties, it becomes necessary to determine the iden-
tity behind each node and assign the responsibility of its interactions to a specific
person.
The following examples provide real implementations of networks that rep-
resent the type of cases this research pretends to support.
AccuCast is a service provided by AccuWeather, a global leader in weather
information. This global service, launched in 2015, allowed an interactive
network where iOS users can share their local weather updates through the
AccUcast application. This idea was designed with the objective to help
people around the world to make more informed decisions, providing a new
level of localization and user interactivity in the weather forecasting process.
[1]
Light Pollution Map consists on a global system of small devices called Sky
Quality Meters (SQM) and Sky Quality Cameras (SQC) that provide a set of
measurements to extract data about the consumption of energy as lightning
in different locations of the globe. [4]
uRADMonitor is a network composed by IoT devices equipped with sensors
for environmental monitoring cities, offices and homes, spread in more then
40 countries to generate uniform and comparable environmental data to be
used on the analysis of current global pollution. [2]
In both cases, if participants decide to provide fake information, the services
becomes untrustworthy and unreliable. However, if a system detects which device
contributed with false information and the responsible entity gets identified, the
system could apply proper punishments to this actor.
4 Blockchain-Based PKI
The goal of the research is to develop a distributed infrastructure capable of
registering the devices admitted in a network into a safe and verifiable data
structure. However, this same infrastructure must be supported by an external
system for identity management, where every user is supported by proofs that
authenticate himself and assign an absolute level of trust that link that user
account to the person that it belongs to.
4.1 High-Level Overview
Keybase can be summed up as a collection of tools that establish a Web of
Trust, associating their users’ accounts to the most common social networks, such
as Facebook, Twitter or Reddit. In order to achieve this, Keybase implements
Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) policies, assigning keys to each account which will
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be used to support a set of proofs that link the same user to other external
accounts from distinct networks. This is done through signed statements posted
in accounts that a user wants to prove ownership of. These constitute a publicly
verifiable collection of identity proofs that can be individually verified to ensure
trust on the interactions established with each account.
Assuming this support for PGP encryption and identity management of
users, Keybase holds a set of capabilities useful for the objective in study. The
signature of artifacts with the keys associated to each account create a direct
link between the respective user and his own digitall properties. Additionally, the
publicly verifiable proofs that the platform administers are sufficient to ensure
a truthful entity behind each user account on Keybase. However, considering
the relevance of this platform for the system in mind, it becomes crucial to find
a way to interact with the tools held by Keybase and integrate them into the
solution to be developed.
For the infrastructure to be developed, Keybase supplies just the enough
resources to support it. Two of the actions required from the encryption opera-
tions that PGP offers are the signature of data and the respective verification of
these originated statements. In order to implement them, the following must be
ensured: the private key of a Keybase account must be securely exported from
the platform, so that the respective owner can use it to sign external data; in
the other hand, Keybase must be able to provide a user’s public data, with its
corresponding public key and account information.
Keybase’s Command Line provides a specific set of commands to extract both
keys assigned to an account on the platform. This pair of PGP encryption keys
must be previously generated by the owner of the account in order to continue the
procedure. At this moment, the priority is to extract the private key associated
the user and import it into the local GPG system. It can only be done if the
user’s session is set in the local Keybase application and the pass-phrase for the
private key will also be prompted. Once the key is successfully retrieved, GPG
allows the user to write it into a visible file in the computer. With this file, the
owner can then carefully use it for digital signature purposes.
The system still requires the retrieval of the information associated to a
specific user account, with special urgency for the public key, for signature veri-
fications. In this case, the Keybase API holds the user/lookup endpoint: a public
API call that retrieves a profile’s information given its username. This request
answers with a complete structure of the profile that was queried. With it, a
field containing the respective public key is presented. An application can easily
ask for this public information and evaluate any signature after retrieving the
proper public key.
A PKI built on the Blockchain constitutes the second component of the
system. It aims to hold a set of digital signatures that link each device to a
single Keybase account. It must be guaranteed that any party on a network of
devices must always be owned by some entity. The blockchain will act as the
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collection of records that will connect both ends in order to assign each device
action to a specific person or organization.
In order to define how blockchain and PKI’s can complement each other,
it is convenient to expose their functions. While the blockchain supports the
distribution of transactions and registration of the blocks in a secure and reliable
way, the Public Key Infrastructure deals with the registration and revocation of
digital certificates that are proof of the ownership of a public key by a specific
identity. In this case, the blocks’ structure must be adapted to the objective,
displaying the necessary data to implement a protocol that easily verifies the
data associated to both devices and Keybase users.
Fig. 3. Block structure of the blockchain
The figure 3 provides a representation of the data to be included in the
registries of the blockchain. Each of the blocks will contain a meta data field,
which is responsible to hold the position of the block in the chain, the hash
of the immediately previous block and the timestamp, in order to verify the
chronological order of the entries. The second field is an object with the relevant
information on the device to be introduced to the system. It will contain the
identification of the node, the Keybase username of the owner and the public
key generated for the device. The username of the owner is an essential field to
retrieve the identity information on Keybase, via the public endpoint of the API
mentioned earlier. The signature property, as the name suggests, will provide
a digital signature of the data object, produced with the private key of the
owner, exported from Keybase. Finally, the hash field displays a fingerprint of
the complete record, based on the three previously mentioned fields.
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4.2 The Protocol
After the overview of the solution, it becomes important to clarify each step of
the protocol to be developed. The following sections describe each of the steps
that constitute the developed work and how they connect each of the components
of the system to achieve the objective in mind.
Fig. 4. Abstraction of the solution’s relevant components and how they should interact
to ensure the linkage between users and devices.
User Registration and Requirements: The initial stage of the procedure
consists on creating a Keybase account. In fact, it is the chosen platform to
handle the identity management of users or eventual organizations and, without
digital records of entities, it is not possible to associate any kind of data to
someone.
The first and second steps illustrated on the Figure 4 are associated to this
user registration. Every action that the actor is required to do can be executed in
the Keybase’s application, where he can insert his personal information and fol-
low the registration tasks imposed by the platform. Keybase might even prompt
every user to go through a proper protocol to link devices in order to strengthen
the bind between user and the account.
In order to become suitable to this solution, every account in Keybase must
be completed with a few proofs that the platform supports. As mentioned previ-
ously, these proofs are public and can be validated by anyone in order to vouch
for the user behind the account. The first and most relevant proof for a user
profile is the creation of a pair of PGP keys. This pair will provide means for
the user to sign public statements that will prove his ownership of other social
network accounts. These same statements also act as proofs on Keybase and are
also a requirement in this protocol, as they are fundamental to guarantee the
trust on a specific user account.
Unfortunately, the Keybase API doesn’t provide any endpoint to submit a
custom package of information to be digitally signed by the authenticated user.
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In order to gain control of these keys, Keybase enables any user to export any
of his PGP keys through Command Line calls.
To be able to execute the mentioned commands, it is demanded to the user
not only to be locally signed into the Keybase application, but also to have the
PGP keys generated in his own account, has referenced earlier. It is also required
a local PGP application such as the GNU Privacy Guard software, to handle
the extracted cryptographic keys.
Device Signature: The second stage of the protocol consists on composing a
structure of information relating a certain device to its public key and Keybase
owner, who should digitally sign it and submit the output as a new transaction
to the blockchain, which is acting as a Public Key Infrastructure.
It is considered a total of three fields that the author assumes to be required
in order to create the pretended association: the device unique identification
number, the Keybase username of the owner and the public key of the device.
The user should only be required to upload the private key extracted in
the first phase together with the pass-phrase that unlocks it and the Keybase
username. A new record is generated and the data is introduced to the blockchain
as a new block that can be verified by any other device that pretends to interact
with the signed equipment.
Ownership Verification: When an interaction between two unknown devices
occurs, it needs to be established a set of verifications by both sides that displays
information about the entities involved in the communication. For a certain
device to validate another device, it must first check on its owner’s identity,
verify the proofs that he presents and check whether they are trustworthy or
not.
In the protocol, the verification can be done through look-ups on the blockchain
and through queries to the Keybase API, as illustrated in the steps 5a and 5b
of the Figure 4. Upon receiving data or a request from a strange device B, the
device A must, first of all, verify for a registry in the blockchain that refers to
B. This block will, as explored before, contain the signature of the information
about this device and provide its respective public key and the username of the
Keybase owner. Gathering this username, it is simple to query for the user on
the public endpoint of the Keybase API. This call, if the username really exists,
will provide a set of data concerning the Keybase account of the owner. Amongst
this information is the public key of the user that can be applied to verify the
block signature. If such is positively validated, the device A can then check on
the number and type of proofs held by the account and decide whether or not to
trust and continue to communicate with B. The diagram provided in the Figure
5 illustrates the possible states on this third protocol phase.
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Fig. 5. Representation of the states during the ownership verification process of de-
vices, comprising a set of validation steps required to verify that a device was really
acknowledged as a property of a properly identified Keybase user.
5 Experiments & Observations
In order to take conclusions on the implemented solution, few experimental use
cases are required to explore the most common situations that the system could
face during execution. With it, it is intended to put the solution to the test and
observe how it reacts towards each of them. Also, this practical method provides
the opportunity to identify weaknesses on the implementation and target a few
goals for future development.
Use Case #1 - Device Signature Verification An interaction between two
devices implies that a certain gadget is requesting to communicate with another
device.
The implemented solution is simulating this request as a single ping to the
network, where a device notifies every other connected nodes with a simple and
unencrypted message containing its nodeId. Receiving this packet, a device can
then lookup for the device that emitted the message and verify its ownership.
Upon retrieving the information of the owner of the sender device, the receiver
can then proceed with the verification of the former entity. From this instance,
it is possible to face one out of three situations:
1. The public key retrieved from the user’s Keybase account doesn’t validate
the block signature;
2. The public key retrieved from the user’s Keybase account validates the block
signature but the user doesn’t provide enough identification proofs;
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3. The public key retrieved from the user’s Keybase account validates the block
signature and the number of associated proofs complies with the minimum
level imposed by the protocol.
The receiver is able to easily verify the signature of the block after collecting
the public key and conclude whether or not the entity that signed the record
really owns the appropriate secret key. If he doesn’t, then it is assumed that he
isn’t the rightful owner of the sender device.
In the situations 2 and 3, the signature is successfully validated with the
public key collected. However, depending on the configuration on the receiver
device, it may require a higher or lower number of proofs in order to accept the
communication with the requester. These proofs can be analyzed together with
the information retrieved and the experiments proved that the implementation
is able to respond correctly to these requirements.
Use Case #2 - Unreliable User Proofs It is possible to create multiple fake
accounts on Facebook, Reddit or Twitter and sign statements from a Keybase
account to claim ownership over them. The most certain is that this fake account
in Keybase will not be followed by any other user.
However, the implemented system is not prepared to consider how many
followers a certain account has for a very simple reason: there is no API call
nor resources provided by Keybase that return the number of followers that a
given account has. The support of these complementary proofs would guarantee
and extra parameter to consider and judge more accurately the identity behind
the devices, being sure that their public statements were verified by other real
entities. If a certain device is receiving interactions from two other nodes of the
network, it may discard legitimate entities and approve malicious ones due to
lack of complementary user data.
Use Case #3 - Revocation of the user’s PGP keys The third use case
contemplates the possibility of a Keybase user revoking his own PGP keys and
replace them by another generated pair, associating it into the account. The Key-
base platform is prepared to handle these actions and propagate the necessary
changes on the user’s chain of proofs.
However, these actions of revocation and update of the PGP keys of a certain
device’s owner brings a negative impact to the implemented solution. As result
of the experiments made, the association of a new pair of PGP keys to a certain
device owner leads to unsuccessful identity checks on the Keybase platform.
This happens because the protocol will look up to the user profile, gathering his
current public key and verify the device signature with it. If this signature was
created with the previous pair of keys, the result will be to consider it as a bad
device signature and it would be impossible to associate the devices to a rightful
owner.
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5.1 Results Evaluation
Theoretically, blockchain’s design provides security characteristics that are eas-
ily adapted to the Public Key Infrastructure concept, allowing for certificate
transparency on signatures and revocations, a reliable collection of transactions
and, due to its distributed and decentralized nature, allows the elimination of
potential points-of-failure created by the adoption of Certificate Authorities in
conventional PKI systems.
From the observed interactions with the conceived protocol, blockchain-based
PKI’s also show the potential to overcome the Web-of-Trust PKI’s. While the
WoT model requires a significant effort to produce a web capable of proving the
trustworthiness of a node to a considerable portion of the network, blockchain-
based PKI’s don’t require such an interconnected structure of authenticated
entities.
The presented approach is built on top of a platform that already imple-
ments this Web of Trust definition through the PGP operations inherent to its
functionalities. The creation of public and verifiable statements that support the
identity of each user allow them to be validated by other real life entities and
vouched through follower statements. Assuming the trust between a set of enti-
ties, the devices owned by them could also be able to interact with each other.
Adopting these WoT characteristics from Keybase, the effort required to imple-
ment the Web-of-Trust PKI would be minimized and the result of this research
could be different.
As denoted in the second use case, Keybase does not provide these follower
statements neither a qualification of the trust between two given entities. Conse-
quently, the intention to develop a WoT PKI becomes somehow more complex.
However, Keybase allows anyone to access a public endpoint of the API to re-
trieve the ownership statements of external social networks accounts and digital
assets, which became the source of trust in the blockchain-based PKI that is
presented.
The implementation described during the previous chapters aims to transpar-
ently display a collection of signatures over the devices participating in a network.
Resorting to this collection of signatures, securely appended to a blockchain that
is distributed amongst the devices, they can check on the ownership of every ma-
chine they interact with and assign the actions of that device to a specific entity
that claimed its ownership. The first use case proves that the protocol is suc-
cessful and that the devices take the proper actions to prevent or allow the
interaction with other unknown devices, based on the proofs provided by their
owners on Keybase.
Considering the third use case, there are still a few operations that could be
integrated and experimented, with special attention to the revocation of users’
PGP keys in Keybase. The revocation and update of keys are common opera-
tions in Public Key Infrastructures and the protocol that was designed could be
complemented with this functionality, providing more flexibility to the system
and a more close approach to what PKI’s should provide to their environments.
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6 Conclusions & Further Work
The research presented in this paper provides a different approach for the In-
ternet of Things segment, adopting the distributed ledger technologies as bridge
between the interaction amongst smart devices and the importance of social
networks in today’s society.
Considering the decentralized, distributed and immutable nature of the blockchain
together with the purpose of Public Key Infrastructures to manage the ownership
of multiple digital assets, it was explored an innovative and simple methodol-
ogy to discover the entity behind a specific device. Resorting to a set of digital
signatures and encryption operations, any action performed by a device can be
assigned to its respective owner, through simple lookups into a PKI built on the
blockchain and queries to the Keybase API, which provides the sufficient proofs
to judge the identity in control of a node.
With this protocol, it is pretended to provide another feasible and secure
implementation for the identity management of entities in the IoT systems, pre-
venting malicious actors from anonymity and impersonation when introducing
devices in the network that can’t get their respective owner properly verified.
However, the implemented solution lacks on some functionalities and im-
provements that would benefit from the continuity of this research.
The most urgent task to implement would be the revocation and update of
users’ PGP Keys, from Keybase. This issue represents a fundamental functional-
ity in every Public Key Infrastructure. Implementing it would prevent a device
from being untraceable to the respective owner after the entity renewing his
Keybase PGP keys.
The consensus algorithm implemented in the blockchain considers only the
largest distributed version of the chain as the legitimate collection of records.
This consensus, being computational simple and requiring low effort from the
devices in order to process transactions, also provides weaknesses. If a certain
device or group of devices with increased computational power works in order to
introduce a longer and corrupted version of the blockchain, it may end up with
tampered or fake registries.
One last aspect to look into would be the experiments on real devices and
simulate the same tested use cases in a real and physical environment. This
experiments would allow to explore which were the minimum requirements for
a device to handle the protocol and how it would impact the efficiency of the
system operations.
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